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This paper proposes an understanding of literary narrative as a form of social cognition
and situates the study of such narratives in relation to the new comprehensive approach
to human cognition, enaction. The particular form of enactive cognition that narrative
understanding is proposed to depend on is that of participatory sense-making, as
developed in the work of Di Paolo and De Jaegher. Currently there is no consensus
as to what makes a good literary narrative, how it is understood, and why it plays
such an irreplaceable role in human experience. The proposal thus identifies a gap in
the existing research on narrative by describing narrative as a form of intersubjective
process of sense-making between two agents, a teller and a reader. It argues that making
sense of narrative literature is an interactional process of co-constructing a story-world
with a narrator. Such an understanding of narrative makes a decisive break with both
text-centered approaches that have dominated both structuralist and early cognitivist study
of narrative, as well as pragmatic communicative ones that view narrative as a form of
linguistic implicature. The interactive experience that narrative affords and necessitates
at the same time, I argue, serves to highlight the active yet cooperative and communal
nature of human sociality, expressed in the many forms than human beings interact in,
including literary ones.
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SETTING THE STAGE: HOW DO NARRATIVES MEAN?
Stories are everywhere in human lives and storytelling is indeed
part of all human cultures. We think in narrative, remember in
narrative and interact in narrative. People tell stories in words,
in pictures and in movement, in musical forms, and through
increasingly diverse multimodal means. We learn through sto-
ries told in the news and in history books, we make decisions
based on stories reported in criminal trials, we find it effort-
less to engage with the fictional stories revealed in our favorite
novels and films. As the semiotician Barthes had noted, “nar-
rative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply
there like life itself” (Barthes, 1977, p. 79). The question remains,
however: why and how are human experiences best organized by
stories?
Stories have been studied for centuries from a variety of per-
spectives and with distinct questions in mind. Although a much
scrutinized subject and the topic of many volumes, the field of
narrative research is still an open one. That narratives play an irre-
placeable role in human knowledge organization is undeniable,
yet the reasons for that very fact remain elusive and ultimately
dependent on the orientation of the research paradigm asking
the questions. Most broadly, work on narrative can be divided
between positivistic (scientific) and hermeneutic (humanistic)
approaches, although that very division often cuts across individ-
ual disciplines and even theorists. Therefore, as I will argue in this
article, narrative is best studied from the point of view of a new
and emerging approach to the study of the mind as developed in
the enactive paradigm. While cognitive science from its inception
has aspired to represent the true marriage of humanistic and sci-
entific ways of understanding, this merging of aims is only just
beginning to be realized in what is termed “enactive cognitive sci-
ence.” This article also attempts to frame some common research
topics between the theoretical study of narrative, as undertaken
historically, and current cognitive science. In a book length study
(Popova, in press) I have developed a model of narrative under-
standing as a cognitive process reliant on perceptual causality, a
phenomenon distinct from mere temporal succession, and expe-
rienced as inherently meaningful, thus linking it to the important
work of Michotte and his intellectual descendants (Michotte,
1963). The experiential notion of perceptual causality is used to
flesh out an understanding of narrative causality and our concep-
tion of action sequences in stories: their intentional nature and
their telicity (the fact that they have beginnings and endings).
This is in tune with a broadly phenomenological understanding
of narrative as strongly implying a meaningful causal structuring,
a teleological grasping of the events of a story in a particular way.
This proposal goes toward explaining narrative’s acknowledged
ubiquity as a form of knowledge organization in a principally
non-representationalist or functionalist way. Definitional in the
enactive approach is that cognition bears a constitutive relation to
its objects. In a similar vein, in my understanding story is defined
further as a relational domain constituted or enacted in the very
interaction between an autonomous agency responsible for the
causal contingencies of the narrative and most commonly known
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as a narrator, and the reader. A recognition of the presence of
such a narrating consciousness that relays the narrative events and
thereby shapes them in the process of telling, and how the story
develops in interaction with the reader, will be developed and
explained through the notion of “participatory sense-making” as
proposed and elaborated in the enactive view of human cognition
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
INTENTIONALITY IN NARRATIVE UNDERSTANDING
Human lives are driven by living in a world where actions take
both a practical and a theoretical priority. From the events of
everyday life, to participation in cultural acts, to just being in the
world, our primary way of interacting with a world is through
practical action. Action is most commonly the result of coor-
dinated movement but it is commonly accepted that not all
movement constitutes an action. Most philosophers and others
deliberating these problems would agree that it is human inten-
tion or purpose that transforms a movement into a deliberate
action, the latter being understood as both the self-awareness
of pursuing a specific goal, and the recognition by others that
an agent’s actions are also deliberate or goal-directed. As some
phenomenologists have argued, the very experience of one’s own
intentionality is linked to the agent’s own self-reflexive con-
sciousness of agency: the awareness that I know that I can cause
something to happen1 . Such a phenomenology of agency that
we possess and that we reciprocally understand others to pos-
sess has been plausibly linked to the evolutionary and cognitive
advantages afforded to our ancestors by the ability to voluntarily
control the body as a means of communicating meaning2. Using
the body thus as an instrument or as a representational mecha-
nism of sorts has been a means of providing our ancestors, but
also any normally developing infant, with a bodily-based sense
of agency. Accepting that human beings are regularly driven by
intention and that intention is to some extent readable for the
people that surround them and share their social and perceptual
world leads also to another fundamental aspect of human con-
sciousness. As understood in phenomenology, this view describes
the understanding that all consciousness (all perceptions, imag-
inings, memories, etc) is intentional, it has directedness toward
an object or person, it is “about or of something”3 . Such an
1See Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p. 158). As the authors explain, this kind
of conscious awareness does not have to be of a very high order; very often
it is just a case of a pre-reflective awareness. At other times, there may be
explicit awareness of acting for a reason, as in more complex decision making
processes.
2Merlin Donald’s theory of “mimesis” as a form of representing reality that is
intentionally controlled because bodily based, goes a long way toward explain-
ing a fundamental difference in representing reality that human beings possess
in distinction to other forms of life (see Donald, 2004). Others have simi-
larly argued that humans are unique in using the body as an instrument (a
tool) for achieving understanding in the public sphere of social life where we
generally dwell. (see Tallis, 2003). The main argument behind both Donald’s
and Tallis’ proposals is that by being able to see, rehearse and refine vari-
ous “mimetic skills” (Donald) or the use of the visible hand (Tallis), human
beings have evolved as the embodied and enactive agents that we are, living
and communicating in a public, shared and visible world.
3See Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p. 7).
understanding immediately calls attention to an inevitable con-
sequence of this, namely, that human thought is intrinsically tied
to the world, be it in the form of physical objects or other living
beings. This also means that human actions are always already
understood by other human beings within a context of inten-
tion, motives and goals, and not as mere physical movements or
random events. In the context of action, human movements are
grasped together, holistically, as an action, or a series of actions.
Our lived experience, as embodied creatures within a social world,
is therefore intrinsically meaningful to ourselves and to others.
Furthermore, a mere unreflective instinctive behavior is to be dis-
tinguished from true agency. Thus, my sitting on the computer
with the intention to write an article is an action, but a bird’s
singing outside my window to attract a mate is better described
as an instinctual response to a possible physiological need. The
reason for this distinction is that my purpose to write an arti-
cle may not be narrowed down to just one thing and thus may
not be uniquely determined or understood by others and even
by myself, covering instead a wide plethora of goals, motiva-
tions, and circumstances, all of which surpass by far an animal’s
more narrowly understood series of actions and their expected,
because ultimately predetermined, outcome. Human agency thus
covers many reasons for acting, which is precisely what cannot
be said of non-human agents. What matters for human inten-
tionality then, including how we understand it when applied to
text interpretation, is that intention itself should not be under-
stood as always uniquely determined or initially hidden and then
discovered or discoverable, but as emerging from a process of
interaction between agents.
The purpose of the above interlude has been to situate the
discussion of narrative understanding that is to follow in the
same context of agency, intentionality and dynamic interac-
tion that have characterized more recent developments in the
study of human action, perception and consciousness. In its
initial description the enactive approach (Varela et al., 1991)
emphasized the indelible link between cognitive processes and an
organism’s embedded activity. Sensorimotor enactivism, as sub-
sequently developed in the work of Noë and colleagues (Noë,
2004, 2010; see also Hutto and Myin, 2013) explains the practical
knowledge characteristic of perception, understood as a pro-
cess of interaction between an organism and its environment.
But social interactions, rather than sensorimotor ones, dominate
certain human practices, specifically the production and recep-
tion of narratives. We act in the world in no small measure
because we expect our actions and intentions to be understood
as meaningful, to be made sense of, by other people. Human
lives in all their inherent complexities take place in the open
space of shared realities and shared meanings, not within indi-
vidual isolated brains. More importantly still, while the agency
of an individual is of great importance for sociality, it is act-
ing for and through one another (interacting) that ultimately
defines who we are. Our human world is a social world and it
takes place in large measure outside of our brains, in the com-
mon shared activity that is life. If we take this view and apply
it in a wider framework, as I will be doing currently, we can
see the reading and understanding of books as essentially not
that different from other forms of interaction within a social
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world: through a careful and deliberate process of intersubjective
sense-making.
Existing characterizations of the reading process of fictional
narratives foreground the nature of meaning in human commu-
nication in general, irrespective of disciplinary affiliation. How do
narratives mean? How do readers make sense of written stories?
How can this process be best described and explained? These are
the questions guiding the research. There are many ways in which
the reading of fiction has been theorized and studied mainly
by literary scholars, but also by discourse specialists, psycholo-
gists and linguists. With some degree of simplification it can be
stated that, despite their differences, the vast amount of existing
approaches see narrative understanding as a process of commu-
nication in which the written text offers meaning and leads to
interpretation through some degree of involvement on the part
of the reader. These approaches can thus be classified as generally
contributing to the explication of a process of “narrative trans-
mission” between an addresser and an addressee in a given act
of communication. From early literary theory (Jacobson, 1960),
through speech-act theory (Searle, 1975) and relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995), to rhetoric (Booth, 1961), and stud-
ies of discourse (Graesser et al., 1994) literary communication
has been assumed to take place between the multiple identities
and functions of the person believed to be sending the mes-
sage: “real author,” “implied author,” “narrator,” and the equally
multiple assumed identities of the “addressee”: “real reader,”
“implied reader,” “narratee.” Within this basic communicative
set-up, many distinctions have been drawn with respect to the
degree to which the process of narrative transmission is mainly
text-centered or reception-centered, on the one hand, and who
the main participants in the process itself are, on the other. I will
deal with each of those distinctions briefly and under separate
rubrics in the next few sections. My own hypothesis about nar-
rative understanding as participatory sense making will be devel-
oped in Sections Narrative Enaction: Changing the Assumptions
of Narrative Understanding, Narrative Enaction and Participatory
Sense-Making, and Narrative Enaction: Current Empirical Data
and Future Possibilities below.
NARRATIVE AS INHERENT STRUCTURE: TEXT-CENTERED
APPROACHES
In this group belong theories that seek to examine textual fea-
tures, properties and characteristics of the narrative text itself
as the most significant aspect of the meaning construal process.
The definitional criteria of narrative proposed in formalist and
structuralist theories have centered on temporal and causal order-
ing, plot and action structure, and orientation toward human
agents and their purposeful actions, among others, all of which
are seen as text-internal and therefore pertaining to issues of
form and content. The structuralists’ project was a deductive,
and ultimately a reductionist, method of identifying the features
of narrative structure independent of the intentions or construal
of the teller or reader of any story. Although classical narratol-
ogists are the main proponents of text-internal views, there is
also a significant amount of psychological and early cognitive
science work that similarly distinguishes narrative from other
forms of thought organization on text-internal grounds. Thus,
even Jerome Bruner (1986, p. 11), considered rightly the father
of “folk psychology” and narrative reasoning, speaks about the
“narrative” and the “logico-scientific” or “paradigmatic” modes
as two distinct modes of cognitive functioning with their own
specific operating principles and criteria of well-formedness that
are manifestly text-specific. On his account people employ the
paradigmatic type of reasoning when they think about scientific
or logical matters, while narrative thought serves the purpose of
explaining the changing directions of human action. Crucially,
Bruner sees narrativity as a structural property, a cognitive invari-
ant of sorts, that only later, in different discourse realizations gets
a constructivist flavor. Early story grammars (Rumelhart, 1975;
Mandler and Johnson, 1977) also attempted to isolate the unique
internal structures (schemata) of narrative through an analogy
with assumed internalized language rules believed to character-
ize the knowledge and use of language, as proposed by Chomsky’s
generative grammar. Thus, these story schemata are formalized
as a set of generative rules that are used to understand and pro-
duce narrative as a specific text-type in opposition to other types
such as description, argumentation or instruction. Schemata and
story grammars are insufficient to explain narrative understand-
ing on their own, however. Despite the fact that they organize
aspects of memory and guide interpretation of new narratives by
supplementing missing information, a good narrative is a dis-
tinctive and coherent series of events uniquely informed by a
specific point of view. Despite the irreducibility of causality as
a mental process, the connectivity and configuration of a good
narrative are imposed by a specific narratorial viewpoint, as I
will argue below, and not a result of a given narrative schema
instantiation4.
Finally, in this group of text-internal approaches I will classify a
number of theories put forward by philosophers and literary crit-
ics that have become known as poststructuralist. As an approach
to the reading of fictional and other texts, deconstruction, which
is another name for the poststructuralist theories I have in mind,
has been the dominant paradigm for a period from the 1960’s
to the 1990’s. Derrida’s differance is understood as a process of
dissemination of meaning wherein all communicative constraints
on a producer and a receiver of meaning are removed in favor
of an agentless and limitless web of signification, which works
against any specific authorial intention and any given interpreta-
tion. The main thrust of the poststructuralist approaches is thus
a search for the latent contradictions in texts that the participants
in a communicative exchange are themselves believed to be blind
to, because any intention at communicating meaning is judged
to be subsumed by the discourse-driven disembodied signifying
process itself. One of the reasons for this ultimately flawed under-
standing of language is the fact that it deliberately ignores the
significant factor of meaning being born in the interaction of the
meaning constitutive practices of human agents.
4The configurational aspect of narrative, seen as not text-internal but stem-
ming from the act of “grasping together” has been proposed by Mink (1978)
and later extensively developed by Ricoeur (1985). Mink, in particular, speaks
about narrative events being properly described not just as events, but as
events “under a description” (Mink, 1978, p. 145). More of this will be
discussed later.
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NARRATIVE AS COMMUNICATION: TEXT-EXTERNAL
APPROACHES
The set of approaches which reject the self-sufficiency of the
text itself and look for describing meaning as the product of the
reader’s reception outnumber by far the text-internal approaches.
The main dividing line concerning issues of reception has to do
with the distinction between more theoretical phenomenological
models of idealized, hypothetical, or universal authors/readers,
and more psychologically grounded ones who have sought to
explicate in a more empirically sound way some of the responses
of real readers to literary texts.
A communicative understanding of literature provides the
starting point for many of the text-external approaches to mean-
ing construal in narratives. Narrative need not be always verbally
instantiated but it needs to be somehow externally presented
to be communicated and understood, as in a silent film, or a
dance, or a mime performance. Verbal communication has been
looked at in terms of the communicative intention of a speaker
and the subsequent interpretation of that intention, but also in
terms of existing conventions (normativity) and context. Unless
some form of explicit verification of the original communica-
tive intention is made, what gets transmitted in an act of verbal
communication is a series of cues that get reconstructed by a lis-
tener. Any communicative exchange is then just an attempt at
meaning making which may or may not be successful. Earlier
models of communication in language relied heavily on the six
elements involved in any verbal communication, proposed by
Jacobson (1960), and their corresponding linguistic functions.
The elements and their respective functions are: the addresser
(“expressive function”); the addressee (“conative function”); the
context (“referential function”); the code (“metalinguistic func-
tion”); the channel (“phatic function”); and the message (“poetic
function”). Jacobson believed that all these functions are involved
in every act of verbal communication but only one was domi-
nant in any particular verbal exchange. Somewhat self-evidently,
the poetic function was seen as specific to forms of verbal art,
particularly poetry. What is important to note even in this early
model is the realization that the message alone does not and can-
not supply all the meaning of the exchange. A speech act is a
process where much of what gets communicated derives from an
interaction between a speaker, and a listener, but also and impor-
tantly with the help of context, code and intention. In literary
theoretical approaches the shift toward understanding narrative
as a form of communication has led to an increased preoccu-
pation with understanding the reception process itself (albeit in
a non-empirical way) and to a move beyond the formalism of
early narratological models. In more linguistic approaches it has
become evident in the increased interest in the pragmatics, rather
than the semantics, of texts.
PRAGMATICS, SPEECH-ACT THEORY AND RELEVANCE
THEORY
Pragmatics, despite its close connection with linguistics, was
originally developed by philosophers, such as Austin (1962)
and Searle (1969), a fact that explains its preoccupation with
what is taken to be the real acts and dynamic contexts of lan-
guage exchanges between people. Pragmatics studies the uses of
language in human communication, which have variously been
termed “parole” (Saussure, 1974), “performance” (Chomsky,
1965) or aspects of “language behavior” (Lyons, 1977), and have
been excluded from strict grammatical descriptions. The assump-
tion in philosophical pragmatics is that in using language we
perform various actions or speech acts, which go beyond the
merely verbal exchange of words. Such an understanding of a
whole narrative as a speech act is a clear precursor to more soci-
ological views of narrative and related notions such as Labov’s
(2003) influential notion of “tellability” or “reportability” of a
story—the reason for telling a story to somebody. The most
important aspect of linguistic pragmatics for our purposes here
is to recognize its open acknowledgement of some degree of
cooperation and reciprocity in language understanding: meaning
and understanding are always correlative. On the face of it this
view appears consistent with the one being developed below of
narrative understanding as participatory sense-making. The key
difference is how the concept of cooperation and participation is
understood: as a passive way of unpacking an intention, in the
former case, or as an emergent interaction, in the latter.
One important contribution of pragmatics to narrative under-
standing is Grice’s (1975) notion of “conversational implicature”
and the related “cooperative principle,” which is nothing more
than a normative assumption of cooperation between language
producers and receivers in any act of verbal communication,
including narrative understanding. Language is rarely able to con-
vey meaning explicitly, so through words and sentences people
say things that prompt others to make inferences and understand
the implied meanings. According to Grice, four maxims, of quan-
tity (is the information sufficient), quality, (is it true), relation
(is it relevant), and manner (is it orderly), underlie the cooper-
ative principle and give rise to different non-explicit meanings
(implicatures). Thus, the successful recovery of an implicature by
a recipient depends on recognition of the communicative inten-
tion of the sender. When a maxim is broken or “flouted,” this is
in turn understood by the recipient to be deliberate and therefore
interpreted as such. An early attempt, among others, to situate
a narrative understanding within a Gricean framework is Pratt
(1977), where both naturally occurring narratives and fictional
narratives are seen as consistent with themaxims of quantity, rela-
tion and manner. What is specific to fictional narrative, however,
is its lack of “truthfulness,” its inherent, because intended yet non-
deceptive, “untruth.” This means that in telling a fictional story its
author deliberately flouts the maxim of quality (its truthfulness)
and thereby marks the text as a distinct form of communication.
What is problematic in this description is the failure to acknowl-
edge the relative unimportance of the reader’s recognition or
interpretation of this assumed illocutionary act of pretense. Does
truthfulness matter for the reader’s interpretation? Does the fact
that fiction is in some sense not real detract from its communica-
tive purpose or intent? Does it therefore evoke or necessitate some
additional way of understanding, such as pretense or “make-
believe?” This has been the position of some philosophers in the
analytic tradition such as Currie (1995) and Walton (1990). In
other work, Adams defines fiction as an act by an author of trans-
ferring origin to another speaker that he creates (Adams, 1985,
p. 10). It is my view that emphasizing truthfulness at the expense
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of relevance is precisely one of the reasons why a communicative
understanding of fictional narratives runs into difficulties. The
lack of truth in fictional narratives is not a real problem if the
principle of relevance is given the priority it deserves, a view given
an extensive treatment in Walsh (2007)5. In other words, for nar-
rative understanding it matters very little if the story relates real
facts, but it matters a lot how it is told and how we make sense of
that telling.
If the four maxims, proposed by Grice, are examined in detail
it is clear that the notion of relevance is of great importance to all
of them. The flouting of the maxims produces implicatures pre-
cisely because some utterances appear to be irrelevant in a given
context. Some linguists have therefore argued that the maxim of
relation (be relevant) overrides Grice’s other maxims. Sperber and
Wilson’s (1995) relevance theory replaces Grice’s cooperative prin-
ciple with the principle of relevance6. The degree of relevance of
a communicated sentence or text is dependent on two factors:
context and processing effort. The optimally relevant interpreta-
tion, as defined by Sperber and Wilson, will be the least costly
one in terms of processing effort and the most extensive one
in the range of its cognitive and contextual effects (Sperber and
Wilson, 1995, p. 125). Relevance theory rightly claims to be able
to account more satisfactorily for a wider range of communi-
cation than much other modern pragmatics does. The reason
for this is that it offers a psychologically valid account of the
mechanisms involved in language understanding. What is psy-
chologically realistic in this account is the acceptance that the
two critical notions for relevance, context and processing effort,
are psychologically motivated notions: they reflect each partici-
pant’s individual and subjective assumptions about the world and
the given context, not some objective, represented and pre-given
versions of it. Relevance theory also emphasizes the importance
of motivation, of identifying the communicator’s intention, for
meaning construal. At the same time, a fundamental problem for
relevance theory with respect to narrative understanding is again
the absence of consideration of the relational nature of that pro-
cess, or, in other words, of omitting the interactional aspect of it.
In assuming a single, optimally relevant and complete interpreta-
tion for all readers and all readings, relevance theory thus fails to
account for the interactive, dynamic, and changeable processes of
meaning construal that different readers or even the same reader
engage in at different times and in different contexts7.
5In much of the psychological work on discourse processing the understand-
ing of texts is also seen as a form of communication. This work has sought
to establish how the reader is able to build and maintain a mental represen-
tation of the text world and all the actions and characters that it contains
(see Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). What is assumed in these models, how-
ever, is a unique and unambiguous message that is encoded in the text and
then decoded by any competent reader in pretty much the same way. This is a
very problematic assumption for reasons that will be discussed below.
6The definition of the principle states that “[e]very act of ostensive (i.e., mutu-
ally manifestly intentional) communication communicates the presumption
of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 158).
7As a general criticism of speech act theory and other pragmatic theories
of interpretation it can be said that they are, in the words of Linell (2005),
“monologic” approaches to language use. This means that they fully embrace
the information processing model of cognition, the simple transfer model of
Despite the fact that pragmatic theory is useful to account
for aspects of narrative understanding, along the lines described
above, it has not been widely applied to narratives for that specific
purpose. When it has been so applied, it has been mainly under
the rubric of rhetoric. One of the best existing examples is the
very influential Rhetoric of Fiction (Booth, 1961), where the novel,
and by extension, any literary narrative, is conceived as a rhetor-
ical act of “telling.” Booth’s undeniable contribution to narrative
understanding consists in elaborating on the relations existing in
the narrative communicative act, and specifically the participants
in it, the details of which will be discussed below. Booth’s own
later work (1988) develops a more interactive understanding of
how readers communicate with books through his metaphor of
books as friends, who can either help or harm us, thus intro-
ducing an ethical dimension to the act of communication. Other
more recent attempts are the rhetorically-oriented work of Phelan
(1996) and Rabinowitz (1977), both of whom also emphasize not
just a communicative but an ethical dimension in the rhetorical
act that is each narrative telling and reception. A step even further
in literary pragmatics is understanding fictionality itself as a spe-
cific rhetorical stance, as developed byWalsh (2007). His position
is that the problem of fictionality should be seen not as a problem
of truthfulness, but of relevance (Walsh, 2007, p. 30) and that each
narrative interpretation is ultimately a matter of how we resolve
the question of relevance: why a certain text is worthy of attention,
interpretation or evaluation for any given reader.
NARRATIVE COMMUNICATION: THE PARTICIPANTS
It is to some extent clear why a conversational narrative can
be seen to be similar as a communicative act to other verbal
exchanges like an ordinary conversation, a public speech or a
letter. For that reason, in text-external approaches to narrative
understanding it has been assumed that the standard for all nar-
ratives is a naturally occurring conversational narrative. Yet, it
is also clear that the communicative context of a fictional nar-
rative can be very different. For a start, any novel is a much
more complex and deliberately crafted linguistic artifact than a
story told at the dinner table. Secondly, the presumed intention
of a writer is not available or knowable in the same way as that
of a conversational participant. In early forms of practical liter-
ary criticism interpretation of texts was sought with the help of
biographical or historical data on the author’s life, an approach
that was soon deemed flawed, however, and exposed by what
is known as “the Intentional Fallacy” (Wimsatt and Beardsley,
1946). What followed was a development of a more sophisti-
cated view of what represents an authorial intention in narrative,
acknowledging that readers rely not on any actual or explicit state-
ments of intention but, rather, recognize the indubitable assump-
tion of intention contained in every text, a view that under-
lies, as I have suggested earlier, how we understand any human
action.
The role of the agent(s) in any form of literary communi-
cation has been controversial and has not been resolved in any
definitive way. The main disagreements concern the levels of
communication, and the code model of language, proposed as far back as
Jacobson (1960).
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communication in a narrative, of which there are thought to
be two, although a hybrid third cross-category has been a main
concern for all kinds of theoretical and practical approaches
to narrative understanding. As Genette has put it, “a narrative
of fiction is produced fictively by its narrator and actually by
its real author (Genette, 1988, p. 139).” Yet, in the absence of
a real person talking, there has been proposed another agent,
a textually implied narrator or author, who leaves a mark of
his/her presence on the text in the shape of its specific norms
and choices8. The concept of the implied author, introduced by
Booth (1961), can thus be seen to describe a text’s assumed inten-
tion: an assumed agency necessarily employed when interpreting
a text. The concept therefore is seen not as a simple prop in
the reading process but an indispensable function of the inter-
pretative process itself, an analytical position that every reader
anticipates and fills. The controversy about the concept concerns
whether it stands for some form of imagined, anthropomor-
phized entity or a textual process itself, with the majority of
opinion weighing in on the position that the implied author is
not a presence but a textual projection of the reader’s own inter-
pretative strategies. Finally, the intra-narrative level of a novel
is the one where communication is taking place between a nar-
rator, who tells the story and a narratee that may or may not
be specifically mentioned. The main point that I would like
to make here is that, no matter what we call it, the reader
constructs some kind of a conversational participant in the
process of reading, a mediating consciousness between herself
and the reported events. That participant is, as Bortolussi and
Dixon suggest, not an abstract or logical characteristic of the
text, but a mental representation in the mind of each reader
(Bortolussi and Dixon, 2003, p. 72). The narrator is a fic-
tional, yet psychologically real, enunciating instance of an act
of telling and telling is, on my view, a form of interaction.
The model I am proposing below offers an explanation that
need not take textual presence and anthropomorphic presence
of a teller as mutually exclusive aspects of the reading process,
but as constituents of the reader’s co-construction of meaning
in a text.
I adopt the narrator in a literary act of communication as
the main participant interacting with a reader for a number
of reasons. First, in naturally occurring conversational narra-
tives, there is always a speaker. Second, literary narratives from
the Homeric epic to the realist novel and beyond have a more
or less explicit and sustained enunciating instance that manip-
ulates what we get to know and how we get to know it.
Indeed, for many theorists the presence of a narrator consti-
tutes a defining feature of verbal narrative, much in the same
way as a film is assumed to be shot through a camera held
and manipulated by a real person. In natural narratives or non-
fictional discourse the author of the discourse speaks in his
or her own voice, while in fictional narratives what is said is
attributed to the speaking “voice” of the text itself and orig-
inates with the narrator, an entity that is separate from the
actual author (Bortolussi and Dixon, 2003; Mellmann, 2010).
8For a detailed examination of the history of the concept and its critical
reception see Kindt and Müller (2006).
This is because both the implied author and narrator are iden-
tified in relation to individual texts, not a compiled entity based
on many texts, something that makes them distinct from the
real author. Similar descriptions include Abbott’s (2002, p. 77)
and Chatman’s (1990, p. 77) “inferred author,” or Eco’s (1990)
“model author.” I hypothesize therefore that a narrator, assumed
to have agency, intentionality and physical perspective is a par-
ticipant in any narrative interaction with a reader9 . If readers
assume the existence of a conversational participant who is the
agent responsible for the text, the process of literary interpreta-
tion is an intersubjective process of sense-making, and will be
a reflection of each individual reader’s distinct construction of
that agent’s stance. In some forms of fictional narrative, such
as 1st person autobiographical fiction, there may be signifi-
cant degrees of overlap between the historical author and the
narrator, a fact which nevertheless does not detract from the
importance of the distinction itself. What is being emphasized
here is that, rather than being an “anthropomorphic fallacy,” as
suggested by Bortolussi and Dixon (2003, p. 174) that partic-
ipant is a real psychological effect of the interactive language
processing, a symptom of the eminently social aspect of human
interaction10. Recent neuroimaging studies have confirmed this
human tendency by showing that silent reading of direct vs.
indirect speech activates voice-selective areas in auditory cortex
(Yao et al., 2011). Seeing narrators as ubiquitous in verbal nar-
ratives should not be seen as simply a linguistic convention or a
mere form of linguistic construction (for this view see Dancygier,
2012) but a natural disposition of the inherent intersubjectivity of
human minds.
Because it is ultimately a form of mental construction, there
has been no unanimity in how various theorists have treated the
concept of the narrator. It has been called a voice (Bal, 1985),
a narrating agent (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983), a narrative position
(Toolan, 1988), or some other form of inferential construction
on the part of the reader (Fludernik, 1993). I suggest that the
presence of a narrator underlies a specific functional feature
of narrative that has already been mentioned, namely, that the
goal of narrative is not primarily informative, but interactive.
Narratives do not just recount general experience, but make it
specific, thereby evaluating it (Polanyi, 1981), and showing it
9In their comments two anonymous reviewers have raised the objection
that ultimately the only minded participant in an intersubjective encounter
with the reader is the real author. As I will argue below, narrative enaction
is likely to depend on types of narrator as well as many other linguis-
tic factors. Whether and how readers respond to these types of narrators
remain, however, largely unexplored empirical questions, although some ini-
tial results will be discussed in the section on empirical data. It is my point
that the presence of a narrator unifies and shapes the reader’s response
in specific ways, depending on how this imaginary participant is con-
strued. It is possible that readers will respond differently to narrators who
are named or are part of the story in some explicit way (e.g., when they
are homodiegetic in Genette’s, 1980 typology), as opposed to 3rd person
heterodiegetic ones.
10For a similar view on the need for the narrator see Mellmann (2010). For
the opposite view seeWalsh (2007). For the view that certain types of narrative
with no explicit linguistic traces of a narrator, such as 3rd person narration or
narration in free indirect discourse, have no speakers, see Hamburger (1973)
and Banfield (1982).
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has a point that is worth sharing (Labov, 2003)11. If we accept
that every text has a speaker and in understanding we interact
with that speaker, the problem is resolved because the interactive
process is not textually but contextually situated. A problem for
establishing the narrator as the main participant in the interact-
ing process may potentially be the fact that some narrators are
seen as “unreliable,” that is as somebody whose rendering of the
story the reader has reasons to suspect (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983,
p. 100). From my perspective it is important to understand that
the reader will employ whatever knowledge they have or may gain
from the narrative in order to make sense of it, irrespective of the
fact that they may suspect inconsistencies in the narrator’s version
of events. This is because the inconsistencies are there to be dis-
covered, played with, and perhaps ultimately resolved (or not), all
of which happens in the process of reading and sense-making.
ENACTIVE SOCIAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Enactive approaches to human cognition foreground the social
and intersubjective nature of human understanding. The name
“enactive approach” to mind and life should be understood as ini-
tially proposed by Varela et al. (1991) and subsequently developed
in Thompson (2007), Stewart et al. (2010) and Di Paolo and De
Jaegher (2012). The most important suggestions of this approach
for research on social cognition, where I situate narrative under-
standing, is the notion of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007). This notion breaks with long standing
assumptions about hidden intentions in individual minds, as
well as with a dominant mentalistic view of how we under-
stand others, such as “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
The notion of participatory sense-making captures the idea that
social interactions are dynamic, unexpected, and to some extent
unpredictable, hence emergent. As I have tried to demonstrate,
understanding the cognitive processes involved in literary recep-
tion have followed closely what has been assumed to constitute
social cognition (albeit related only to language processing), as for
example, in the cases of linguistic pragmatics or discourse studies.
Recently, there have been explicit attempts to describe the pro-
cesses of literary interpretation as mind-reading, where reading
and making sense of fiction is seen as a pleasure inducing exer-
cise of our theory of mind (Zunshine, 2006). The problem with
these approaches, as I see them, consists precisely in the men-
talistic slant that they promote. While there is a more decisive
turn toward exploring the socially situated nature of character
minds in Palmer (2004), it is still the case that the social and pub-
lic nature of mind is used here in an observer-like way to make
sense of characters’ actions and emotions and not as framing
11It is of interest to note that the concept of the narrator has been largely
ignored in studies of discourse processing. In more recent cognitive narratol-
ogy the issue of intention has resurfaced with the notion of “the intentional
stance,” used by Herman (2008) to account not only for what he calls “an
innate tendency to read for intentions” (p. 240) in narrative practice, but also
to argue that it is narrative practice itself that gives rise to such human ten-
dency to ascribe intentionality. It is proposed by Herman that the problem of
whose intention is communicated in a narrative can be resolved by treating it
as a “structure of know-how” in a more general process of folk-psychological
reasoning, a point to which I will return below when discussing his views on
how narratives mean.
an interactive engagement with a reader. As Di paolo and De
jaegher put it, mentalizing or reasoning about the supposed men-
tal states of others is a legitimate cognitive process, but not one
that is at play always or in general (Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2012, p. 2). Moreover, the view that the “shared mind” is pri-
mary has been around for a long time, evidenced in the work
of a number of thinkers from distinct traditions such as phe-
nomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1945), social-cultural psychology
(Vygotsky, 1978), analytic philosophy (Hutto, 2004), develop-
mental psychology (Trevarthen, 1979; Hobson, 2004), and more
recently linguistics and cognitive semiotics (Zlatev, 2005; Zlatev
et al., 2008). The enactive view of human cognition, also broadly
comparable to what is called “intersubjectivity” by some theorists
(Zlatev et al., 2008), proposes a markedly different view from the
theory of mind positions about how we understand other people.
It argues that it is not simply the case that humanmental states are
primarily private or solipsistic, and only subsequently, through
inference or simulation, they get projected onto others so that we
can know what they are thinking. The claim is that in some basic
sense, forms of human engagement with others (beliefs, inten-
tions, attentional states, and even emotions) are fundamentally
intersubjective.
For theory of mind approaches there are two ways that these
assumed intersubjective processes work: either through some
form of information processing reliant on innate computational
modules of “intention detection,” “shared attention mechanism,”
etc. (Baron-Cohen, 1995) or through unconscious simulation
of the intentions or feelings of another (Goldman, 2006). The
implausibility and shortcomings of the former have been duly
criticized by Gallagher (2008) in favor of “direct perception”
in which the developing human subject engages without any
need for complex mentalizing. With respect to the latter, it is
of great value to look at Di Paolo and De Jaegher’s (2012)
own assessment of sub-personal neural mechanisms (such as
mirror-neurons) that simulation theorists promote as the sub-
strate underlying social cognition. Rather than seeing mirror
mechanisms as causally responsible for social cognition (which is
the dominant view), Di Paolo and De Jaegher very plausibly sug-
gest that in fact it is interactive social experience that may produce
the mirror functions and the imitative actions that are observed
in human subjects. This distinction importantly draws attention
to the fact that sub-personal neural mechanisms may be neces-
sary but not sufficient for social understanding, thus depicting
a crucial distinction between the two. The inherent plasticity and
malleability of themirror neuron system in humans is also indica-
tive of social interactions playing at least an enabling role for
the development of these mechanisms (Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2012).
NARRATIVE ENACTION: CHANGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
NARRATIVE UNDERSTANDING
It is important to see the implications for social cognition of
enactive cognitive science when put against the framework of
embodied cognitive science as a whole. Much recent work in
cognitive linguistics (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999;
Hampe, 2005) has assumed that meaning is grounded in sen-
sorimotor experience, but this experience is commonly framed
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as unconscious cognitive processing as in Lakoff and Johnson’s
“cognitive unconscious”), basic motor schemas (Mandler, 2004;
Hampe, 2005) or neural activations (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).
This framing deliberately blurs the distinction between conscious
experience and sub-personal neural processes which may ulti-
mately ground embodied experience but are not equivalent to
it. Barsalou’s (1999) work on perceptual symbol system, inno-
vative as it was for its rejection of a separate abstract level of
conceptual representation, also carries the mentalistic torch in
equating concepts with modality-specific neural activations, thus
bypassing the issue of conscious conceptual knowledge and, the
social nature of its linguistic realization. Despite claims to the
contrary, a description of language as essentially a private intra-
mental phenomenon shared between people solely on the basis
of their common embodiment, as promoted currently in nearly
all research in cognitive linguistics, is the old mentalistic view but
dressed differently. Linguistic knowledge can never be private, as
Wittgenstein (1953) noted long time ago, and cannot be reduced
to what goes on in individual minds or brains. The interactive
nature of linguistic encounters is not addressed to a satisfactory
level in the theory of “conceptual blending” (Fauconnier and
Turner, 2002), where the dynamic aspect of meaning construal is
noted, but human cognitive processes are described again as sub-
conscious acts of “blending” together various elements (concepts,
frames, whole scenarios), thus producing new and emergent lin-
guistic meanings. Needless to say, none of these developments in
the cognitive science of language attend to the intentional, rela-
tional, and participatory emergence of meaning among conscious
subjects who share a language.
My situating of the study of narrative understanding within
an enactive view of human cognition grows out of a deep dissat-
isfaction with various models of literary cognition, as discussed
above, that have looked at narratives as texts to be interpreted,
without broader considerations about how cognition is enacted.
Hence, even though there are many books on cognition and
narrative (Turner, 1996; Herman, 2002; Dancygier, 2012), my
proposal here aims to create a more radical turn in the cognitive
study of literature by firmly situating narrative study as a form of
enactive cognition12. One of the main points that I am making
throughout this paper is that stories are not static or inert cul-
tural artifacts; they are expressions of intersubjective meaningful
action and participatory sense-making between tellers (narra-
tors) and readers. In other words, they are interactive processes
in their own right, as opposed to formal structures (as assumed
in structuralist narratology), or individualistic (monologic) pro-
cesses of reader interpretation (as taken up in discourse studies or
pragmatic theories of communication).
To bring the discussion back to narrative understanding,
and specifically narrative understanding achieved through the
medium of language, we need to address again the nature of
12I acknowledge the fact that recently there have been attempts to develop
models of literary narrative understanding that also use some form of enac-
tive cognitive science to substantiate their claims, such as Herman (2008),
Caracciolo (2012a,b, 2013). The specifics of how these valuable hypotheses
are situated in relation to the one proposed here will be taken up in the next
section.
linguistic meaning, but this time take into account the enactive
view, as introduced above, and explore its implications for lan-
guage. Particularly, it is important to look at how the inevitability
of a co-evolving meaning change in any linguistic encounter can
modify long-entrenched ideas about language and its nature. As
shown above, traditional forms of linguistics adopt the same
ontological assumption about meaning as traditional computa-
tional approaches to thought processes, namely that it is possible
to analyze the world in terms of context-free data. In relation to
language, this view is summed up in semantic descriptions of lin-
guistic units as sets of fixed and independent elements, termed
concepts or symbols. Pragmatics, as I have shown, attempts to
override the inefficiencies of this description by postulating var-
ious contextually implied meanings, but still suffers from the
assumption of a transfer model of communication between indi-
vidual minds, and the accompanying assumptions of fixed pre-
determined meanings that require decoding. For that reason, in
some accounts written and spoken language have been treated as
two distinct modes of language behavior (Chafe, 1994), the for-
mer characterized as a formal system of symbols and rules; the
latter, as the pragmatic use of these forms and rules in everyday
speech.
This polarized view of essentially two kinds of language has
been shown to be a misrepresentation and a simplification of how
language works, termed “the written language bias in linguistics”
(Linell, 2005). Similar view with respect to the language sciences
and linguistics in general have been voiced before by Harris (1981,
1996), who suggested that linguists do not describe “real lan-
guage” but fabricated, “mythical” forms of it that do not match
the reality of language use.More recently, Linell (2009) has argued
strongly that the dominant view in linguistics of language as a
system of abstract symbols and rules that somehow get transmit-
ted and decoded between individual minds in communication is
insufficient to account for the dialogic nature of actual linguistic
exchanges. He has proposed instead a view whereby the action-
oriented aspects of language are given a priority and he has named
this process “languaging,” as opposed to the original pragmatic
term “language use” (Linell, 2009, p. 274). The latter, according to
him, still promotes the abstract mental nature of language, which
is then seen as secondarily and perhaps only peripherally being
put to use in a given context. The process of “languaging,” on the
other hand, highlights the active, spatially and temporarily sit-
uated, and interactive nature of how we speak to each other. It
draws attention to the fact that meanings in language are made
and not simply retrieved. It connects with the enactive view of
human cognition in its recognition of the fundamentally social
and co-authored nature of human meaning-making, and gives
it a description unavailable in more traditional linguistic theo-
ries. A basic question concerns whether speech and writing are
ultimately different in that the latter is assumed to be more com-
plete, rigid and final, thereby restricting any potential interactive
dynamics present in talk-in-interaction. The point I am making
here is that when we read written narratives we enact them; we
invest them with a speaker that we treat as a conversational par-
ticipant, we become willing partakers in their worlds, but they
also become part of ours. Narratives constitute both interventions
in our sense-making powers as readers, and are, reciprocally, the
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dynamic constructs of the intervention itself. It is simply not true
to say that narrative enaction happens in one direction only; from
a text to a reader. Yes, we have all felt the unmistakable pull of a
book or a film, when hours, even days and months, after reading
a story a given character, a scene, or a moment stays with us to
the extent that we cannot push it away. We have all experienced
the inability to put a book down despite various urgent demands
on our time. How does a story achieve this high level of commu-
nion with a reader? How is this possible and more importantly,
why are these processes so specific to our individual sensibilities,
if we take stories to be autonomous and self-contained worlds? I
argue that they are not. When we read, we re-create a situation, a
moment, an act in order to understand it. This understanding is
shared, yet also personal and dependant on many factors such as
gender, knowledge, verbal expertise, and experience, among oth-
ers. Borrowing the words of the poet Antonio Machado, Varela
described enaction as the laying down of a path in walking:
“Wanderer the road is your footsteps, nothing else; you lay down
a path in walking” (Varela, 1987, quoted in Thompson, 2007, p.
13). I would like to use the same metaphor to describe the process
of literary reading: each one of us lays a path when we experience
a meaningful encounter with a story. That path is and stays our
own, although it may change on subsequent encounters with the
same text. This uniquely subjective and experiential process that
literary fiction engenders goes toward explaining the overwhelm-
ing multiplicity of interpretations that people come up with, and
the consequent disagreements over literary meanings that have
troubled the study of literature. This need not be considered the
disciplinary disadvantage that it has been taken to be, as I will
argue below.
The participatory sense-making, proposed by De Jaegher
and Di Paolo (2007), pays attention to two factors: both indi-
vidual cognition, and interaction, neither of which, on its own,
is sufficient to account for the relational dynamics of social
cognition. In the context of literary narratives this means that
as readers we share in the narrating, moment by moment, of
the unfolding events. Maintaining patterns of coordination, but
also breakdowns of coordination and recovery are all part of
participatory sense-making. I see literary narrative understanding
as such a process of participation. Conflicts are possible and
in fact often necessary when a particular prediction we make
as readers turns out to be wrong. Narrative emotions such as
curiosity, surprise, and suspense are indeed the result of such
continual conflict between a reader’s causal construal through
trial and error of the unfolding narrative dynamics13 . The main
avenue for coordination between reader and teller in a narrative
is thus temporal dynamics: flash-forwards and flashbacks in
the sequence of events, the rapid tempo of a summary vs. the
slowness of a scene, techniques like showing and telling, are all
temporal displacements, epistemological consequences of the
proximal or distal self-positioning of a narrator. A literary story,
much more than the stories we tell daily, relies on how the telling
decides on and arranges what is told, which the reader enacts
in sense-making. This is rarely a linear process and one that
13See Sternberg’s (1978) account of narrative dynamics, based specifically on
these three narrative emotions.
leaves gaps, ambiguities, rival perspectives, and often unresolved
open-endedness. Examining the interactive possibilities of telling,
of mediacy in literary narratives, most commonly studied in
terms of temporal/perspectival dynamics, and grammatically
realized through the categories of tense, aspect, and aktionsart,
thus provides a way to put side by side linguistic function and
the sense-making processes of the reader. Textual features and
aspects of narration, which can be studied systemically, can then
be correlated with observed responses.
What I argue further is that the interactive potential of writ-
ten narratives is not diminished by the nature of our encounter
with them, i.e., as written texts. Linguistic choices do channel
this encounter and guide the interactive process through vari-
ous means, as suggested. But these are not grammatical choices
only. When we enact a narratorial viewpoint, it is not because the
narrator is a mere linguistic construction or a discourse feature
that we decode, but because we experience it as a meaning-
ful participatory act between ourselves and the teller. The main
underlying assumption behind my claims is that the language
of fiction does not simply reflect nor describe an objective real-
ity for the reader to recreate but is very much an instrument
in the co-creation, or to put in enactive terms, in the bringing
forth, of that reality. If we accept, as I do, that narrative pre-
supposes intentional directedness, a “grasping together,” which
involves causality, as phenomenological narrative theorists like
Mink (1978) or Ricoeur (1985) suggest, then we can say that
the sense-making processes we engage in will result in a rela-
tional reshaping of that causally shaped grasping for each reader,
a sense of change, of an alteration of experience14. This happens
because so much of the experiential world of the story becomes
the reader’s own world.
NARRATIVE ENACTION AND PARTICIPATORY
SENSE-MAKING
The enactive approach to social cognition has not been applied to
literary reading in the form suggested here, although there exist a
number of previous considerations, which despite using differ-
ent terminology and with very different ends in mind, can be
evaluated for the relational aspect of literary reading that they
highlight. I examine some of these suggestions here and evalu-
ate them in relation to the enactive view I propose, beginning
with older theories and finishing with some recent ones that
have relied on enactivism for their models. A theoretical focus
on the reader is historically associated with the Constance School
in Germany, where hermeneutics (in the case of Jauss, 1982) and
phenomenology (in the case of Iser, 1978) were used to produce
largely theoretical accounts for the processes of readers’ contri-
bution to textual meaning. Reception theory, as these models are
14In relation to everyday story-telling a similar claim has been developed
under the name of “the narrative practice hypothesis” (Hutto, 2007). The
proposal is that folk-psychological understanding of other people occurs nor-
mally as an effect of story-telling practices, through the support of others.
Reasons for acting thus become familiar to children through explanation, link-
ing beliefs, desires and outcomes in social scenarios. The problem with this
is that beliefs and attitudes are, more commonly, aspects of the way agents
reflect, post hoc, on their own or others’ activity. While these are verifiable in
everyday contexts, explanation becomes problematic in the context of fiction.
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known, produced some valuable contributions that can be seen as
relational in the sense of enactive cognitive science. Participation
is definitional to the notion of “textual gaps” or points of inde-
terminacy in any text (Iser, 1978), which the reader needs to fill.
Literary texts have more gaps than other forms of communica-
tion, hence, require more active participation. For Iser literature
is markedly different from other forms of language encounters
because literary texts represent not the real and known world but
generate fictive worlds which are completed in distinct ways by
the reader (Iser, 1978, pp. 23–27). His main point is that tex-
tual structures, what he calls “textual perspectives” embedded in
the text, in some sense control reader response, so that there are
always certain limits imposed on reception processes. One signif-
icant problem for this theory is that no attempt was ever made
by Iser to connect his view of the reception process with actual
empirical work on real readers. At the same time, it is clear that
for Iser textual meanings are understood as potentially “given” in
the text and then jointly realized through reader’s involvement.
Understanding the text as unfinished, as a potentiality, as a
“virtual reality” has been a part of other treatments of literature
that can be seen as a starting point for an enactive study of narra-
tive texts. Ryan (2001) speaks of immersion in narrative worlds,
Gerrig (1993) uses the metaphor of transportation to describe
what takes place in the mind of the reader, and Nell (1988), of
entrancement or being lost in a book. While these theories cap-
ture some of the reader’s involvement, they still present a picture
where the overall assessment of what happens with a reader in
an encounter with a book is quite passive. In the analytic tradi-
tion Walton (1990) has proposed a representational theory of art,
where books (and other art forms) are understood as props that
prescribe and guide specific imaginings, similarly to the way chil-
dren use toys to participate in games of pretense. I think that the
notion of participation is already contained in Walton’s view of
texts as props. Given the inherent ecological meaning of props,
an interesting question would be to explore types of text in rela-
tion to “easiness of use” of those props. In terms of comparison
with the enactive view, Walton’s is still a mentalistic view where
imagination is understood as an intramental imaginary experi-
ence, instead of an interactive one. More recent views from the
philosophy of aesthetics and cognitive science speak more openly
of mental simulation as an important part of the reading pro-
cess (Currie, 1995; Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002). Simulation
is understood here as the automatic mental mimicry of a spe-
cific experience attributed to another (Goldman, 2006), hence
as resulting from the sub-personal mirroring processes that sim-
ulation theories rest on. It was argued above that simulation
theories of understanding other people have their serious prob-
lems, which an enactive view of social cognition tries to address.
On that basis, applying simulation theories to understanding fic-
tional minds is also problematic. Perhaps closest to the view I am
proposing comes Ryan’s (2001) discussion of “spatio-temporal
immersion” in narrative and its connection to specific linguis-
tic forms. Ryan rightly assumes that the reader’s participation
somehow relates to degrees of self-involvement (Ryan, 2001, p.
98) but these are not systematically correlated with specific tex-
tual features, and the possible dependencies remain unexplored.
Ryan adopts an (unacknowledged) embodied and enactive view
of making sense of a narrative when she speaks of the reader’s
“virtual body” inhabiting the narrative world, adopting certain
perspectives, prospective vs. retrospective narration, the use of
present tense, etc., all of which are taken to be specific narra-
tive strategies for reader immersion (Ryan, 2001, pp. 133–134).
It is relevant to point out here that postulating interaction, as in
my proposal, instead of mental simulation gets rid of some of the
difficulties faced by immersion/simulation theories.
In more recent work a prominent narratologist (Herman,
2008) has proposed an understanding of texts as a form of joint
attentional engagement with artifacts. This proposal is enactive
to the extent that it assumes some form of narrative intentional-
ity which is realized not internally, as a hidden mental object to be
communicated, but in the form of practical know-how whereby
textual cues, for example deictic shifts, are seen as prompts (affor-
dances) for construing meaning. While very much in agreement
with the general enactive standpoint that Herman takes, I have
two main reservations about this formulation. First, the accepted
view in ecological psychology is that affordances are dispositional
properties of physical objects15 . Describing texts as providing
affordances for interaction with an interpreter is therefore a form
of sensorimotor enactivism (Hutto and Myin, 2013), more suited
to explanations of practical knowledge, rather than social inter-
action. I am not sure to what an extent Herman takes texts to
provide affordances metaphorically (at one point he compares
textual designs with a coffee machine’s built-in activity struc-
ture to make coffee (p. 256). If taken literally, the proposal raises
a second objection in that affordances are understood here as
inherent properties of texts which somehow tell us directly what
to do with them, leaving the laborious and temporal process
of sense-making unattended to. Yet, as I have argued before,
textual understanding is a dynamic process unfolding in time,
going through rhythms of coordination, breakdowns and recov-
ery, which often does not end with a story’s conclusion. The
key to literary understanding, I argue, is a deliberate process of
sense-making, reliant on conscious modification and regulation
between intentional agents (real or imaginary), and hence neces-
sitating a prolonged attention and also something akin to what
Tomasello (2014) very recently described as “shared intention-
ality.” In other words, it is not the structure of narratives, or
language, or culture per se, that generate intersubjective under-
standing, but the inherent socially recursive and “shared” mind
that sets this process in action (see also Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2012). Agency is prior to action and literary interpretation is con-
tinually created by readers not in the form of reproduced textual
patterns (plot or structure), nor passive automatic dispositions
and affordances, but as shared agency, as a constant attunement
to the assumed agency of another.
Another recent view, proposed by Caracciolo (2012a), already
moves beyond Herman’s view of textual cues as affordances, and
toward something closer to what I am proposing here. While
15The Gibsonian sense of affordances (Gibson, 1979) describes an organism’s
perception/action in terms of the opportunities arising from its interaction
with an environment. Affordances are bundles not of qualitative data, but
of immediately given motor information which facilitates perception and
practical action (p. 134).
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elsewhere the author hasmaintained that in understanding fiction
the reader simulates a fictional consciousness, most commonly
the one(s) that the text gives direct access to Caracciolo (2013),
here he sees narrative understanding as a dialog between author
and reader, a form of shared experientiality. Despite relying on
the notion of joint attention and Dennett’s intentional stance (as
does Herman), Caracciolo is taking a non-explicit step toward
interaction when he claims that authors and readers experience a
story in essentially similar ways (p. 198)16. Where he differs from
my proposal is in his separation between experientiality (what
he calls “the intentional level”), mainly seen as embodied, non-
conceptual knowledge, constituting the common ground between
agents in a narrative situation, and higher-order, narratively con-
stituted interpretations, which he sees as essentially distinct from
the former. The shared reality of a created storyworld is thus taken
here to be based solely on the shared embodiment and shared cul-
tural practices of the participants, and not as the shared intention
of a participatory process of sense-making of individual agencies
that I am proposing. As I argued above, joint attention is born in
collaborative activity, that is, in shared intentionality, not just in
sub-personal, shared embodiment.
NARRATIVE ENACTION: CURRENT EMPIRICAL DATA AND
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
It is part of my proposal to emphasize that work done in the field
of empirical studies of literature bears directly on the enactive
view, as developed here. In this section I discuss the empirical
possibilities of that approach, both with respect to current find-
ings and future research. The empirical study of literature, the
examination of real, as opposed to hypothetical acts of reading,
is where a lot of what has been discussed above can demonstrate
its validity and validation. As an experimental activity the empir-
ical study of literature is reliant on the methods and assumptions
used in psychology and discourse studies. Historically, it has been
a willfully neglected field, especially given the large theoretical
body of work dealing with literary meaning, as shown in the pre-
vious discussion. It is of great interest to my current proposal that
some form of participatory understanding of the processes of lit-
erary reception can be found precisely among practitioners of the
empirical study of literature (Bortolussi and Dixon, 2003; Miall,
2006). Bortolussi and Dixon propose an approach that they term
“psychonarratology,” where textual features are examined in close
correlation to reader interpretive constructions in the context of
a specific reading (Bortolussi and Dixon, 2003). Miall and Kuiken
(1994) and Miall (2006) investigate how specific features of the
language of texts (imagery, alliteration, meter, syntactic inversion,
etc.) influence meaning creation by readers.
The first main issue in empirical studies is a question of
research design: how best to study a given text. Discourse stud-
ies have traditionally examined questions of inference in a text:
from causal connections between narrative events, to process-
ing of anaphoric expressions, to textual cohesion, and other text
properties. This type of research uses simplified short narratives,
thus greatly limiting the scope and usefulness of any findings
16In another paper (Caracciolo, 2012b), the author also suggests looking at
narrative interpretation as a “joint process of sense-making.”
by the assumption that all texts, regardless of complexity, make
the same requirements on a reader. When real texts are the sub-
ject of experimental research, there are a number of options that
researchers can take. The most promising one for participatory
sense making is the one where particular aspects of a literary text
are manipulated, thus isolating a specific effect, and then compar-
ing the reception of that text with the one of the original text. If we
accept the hypothesis that a reader enacts a particular narratorial
consciousness, there are aspects of how the narrator is presented
in a text that are immediate candidates for such empirical work.
For example, 1st person, 3rd person, omniscient or figural narra-
tion require examination with respect to ease of comprehension
and/or aesthetic judgment (value). Another outstanding empiri-
cal question is: do readers consciously differentiate between such
types of narrators, and if they do how this influences the sense-
making process? Consciousness in a novel is displaced from the
situation of telling in either time (reporting the past or the
future), or person (type of narrator), and these displacements
correlate with specific sense-making strategies. Hence, in conver-
sational narratives story peaks happen in the present tense and the
use of the present in a literary narrative becomes a linguistic signal
of immediacy vs. displacement (Chafe, 1994). Second, the long
standing discussion in narratology between the two main nar-
rative rendering techniques: showing and telling (Genette, 1980)
needs to be evaluated for the same effects. Manipulation of texts
with these types of specific features will provide ways to under-
stand how the positioning of the narrator (proximal, in showing;
or distal, in telling) to the narrated events affects sense-making.
Again, I emphasize the point that in narrative grammatical fea-
tures, like tenses, are not just forms that correspond to divisions
into past, present and future, but also signals to control how
some information is to be enacted. Narrating from a particular
spatio/temporal or personal/vicarious viewpoint creates for the
reader an experiential stance for participation in the storyworld.
Third, the main narrative situations pertaining to any narrative
sense-making consist of the narratological categories of person
(does the narrator belong or not to the narrative world); dis-
tance (does the narrator adopt a retrospective or synchronous
temporal position); and perspective (does the narrator present an
inside view of events and characters, or an external one, or both)
(Genette, 1980; Stanzel, 1984). The variations that these combi-
nations provide work toward establishing degrees of availability of
the narrative worlds that we inhabit as readers: as a reader I can-
not conceive of an imaginary world in which I am not present. But
they also serve the purpose of a reader’s intersubjective alignment
with the narrating consciousness of the story.
Various aspects of reader involvement have made it into
the experimental designs of empirical studies. For example,
Bortolussi and Dixon have studied degrees of identification with
a narrator that a reader undertakes as an aspect of implicitly
and explicitly given knowledge about the narrator’s actions. They
manipulated a text excerpt, so that it became more explicit about
the narrator’s purpose and created two conditions with an origi-
nal and analtered text. They predicted that when the reader has to
work more, as in reading the original passage, there will be more
identification, more opportunity to attribute their own experi-
ence to the narrator. The results confirmed that even though the
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 895 | 11
Popova Narrativity and enaction
explicit altered versions provided more information, the readers
saw the narrator as easier to understand in the original version.
Miall’s (2006) approach is also strongly consistent with the pro-
posal of participatory sense-making. By studying “literariness”
or “foregrounding,” which originates with formalist views and is
traditionally associated with text-specific formal qualities such as
metaphor or alliteration, Miall shows it to be a manifestation of
the enhanced special nature of the interaction processes between
reader and text. Literary narratives have a “dehabituating” role
to play in human cognition, which means they invite us to con-
sider frames for thought and feeling that are novel or unfamiliar
(Miall, 2006, p. 3), hence more demanding. Importantly for the
discussion here, dehabituation is an interactive process initiated
by language forms in literary reading, but experientially corre-
lated with heightened attentional or aesthetic states in readers that
can be experimentally verified. Finally, Miall’s approach points to
a need to engage not just in studying how readers interpret texts
but in how they experience literary works, a requirement which,
importantly, includes considerations of feeling. While most the-
oretical and empirical work on narrative engages the issue of
interpretation, an important question that remains largely unad-
dressed is what kind of experience is brought by reading, and
the answer is emotive experience. Empirical findings about self-
implication during reading (Larsen and Seilman, 1989) show that
readers of literary texts draw more on active personal experience.
Such results may not only be a validation of the enactive view
but also a way to define what is distinctive about literature as a
sense-making process.
CONCLUSION
The theoretical and practical study of literary narratives has pro-
duced multiple and often contradictory ways of explaining their
structure, function, and meaning. Regardless of this prolonged
scrutiny there is currently no consensus as to what narratives are
and why people find them both engaging and uniquely suited for
expressing aspects of human experience. I have argued that sto-
ries do not happen in individual minds, either those of tellers or
readers, but in the dynamic interaction between them. Traditional
narratology, as well as cognitivist story grammars, have relied on
static abstract structures of text which are assumed to determine
readers’ understanding through detached mental representations
of a story world. A pragmatic communicative understanding of
stories, on the other hand, has assumed that both language and
the verbal stories that we tell in it, are explicable through an
information processing model of cognition and a transfer model
of communication, both of which have proved insufficient. I
have argued that stories are best understood as processes of pat-
terned interaction, prospectively anticipated and retrospectively
reflected upon in a participatory sense-making between essen-
tially two participants: a reader and a teller. This to some extent
imaginary participant is not just a linguistic effect but a manifes-
tation of the irreducibly intersubjective nature of human minds.
Literary reading is thus a shared act of participation, moment by
moment, in the unfolding action; a process of leading and being
led in order to enact an experience. I, as a reader, supply the mem-
ories, the imaginings, and the feelings in order to inhabit a world
that until then is not my own, but becomes my own when I enact
it. A meaningful encounter with a story is thus a participatory
act of performance where meaning lies not in words, concepts or
events but in the intersubjective spaces they create between the
participants.
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